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Introduction 
Questions regarding a criminal defendant’s possible mental disorder may emerge 
at nearly any point in criminal justice proceedings: during arrest, preliminary hearings, 
trial, sentencing, incarceration, and release decision making.  Often times, the law 
explicitly identifies the relevance of mental disorder. For example, legal doctrine 
addresses the ways in which mental disorder might impact a criminal defendant so 
severely that it precludes participating in trial (Dusky v. United States 1960) or culpability 
for a given offense (United States v. Brawner 1972). On the other hand, there is no 
comprehensive or integrated approach to mental disorder within the criminal justice 
process (Cohen 1996).  Mental disorder may prove relevant to one legal question but not 
another, and different disorders—even different symptoms of the same disorder—may 
result in substantially different legal outcomes.  
 The attention the law gives to mental disorder is understandable when one 
considers the prevalence of mental illness among those who pass through the criminal 
justice system.  For example, Justice Department statistics indicate that 35% of jail and 
2prison inmates suffer from a mental disorder, and a recent large-scale study of pre-trial 
arrestees in New York found that 22% had a moderately serious or serious mental illness 
(see Redding 2004). 
 However, mental disorder is not relevant only to questions of criminal law. 
Aspects of civil law address mental disorder when it causes concern that an individual 
may pose a danger to self or to others, even if no criminal law has been violated. Other 
psycho-legal questions in the civil context require determining, for example, whether 
mental disorder so impairs an individual that she cannot competently consent to medical 
treatment or execute a will.  Following is an overview of the major classes of mental 
disorder and the ways in which they are salient to selected aspects of American criminal 
and civil law, focusing particularly on criminal law issues.  
Overview of Mental Disorders Relevant in Legal Contexts 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, now in its fourth 
edition, (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association 2000) serves as the standard 
diagnostic reference for mental health professionals.  The manual catalogues the 
numerous syndromes that scholars have recognized, based upon research, as distinct and 
identifiable mental disorders.  The manual also describes the diagnostic criteria for each 
disorder and related clinical information such as specific age and gender differences, 
typical course of the disorder, and prognosis. Thus, the DSM-IV-TR provides an official 
nomenclature for collecting clinical information, teaching, and communicating about 
mental disorders across a variety of contexts and disciplines.   
 For organizational and theoretical purposes, the DSM-IV-TR divides disorders 
according to type (e.g., Eating Disorders, Anxiety Disorders, Sexual and Gender Identity 
3Disorders, Mood Disorders, Personality Disorders).  Although it is conceivable that 
nearly any disorder might become relevant in a particular legal question, certain classes 
of mental disorder emerge in legal contexts far more often than others. Legal 
professionals with even a basic knowledge of such disorders may be better able to serve 
their clients and identify when particular issues of law may be relevant (Redding 2004).  
 Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders:  
 Because they are among the most debilitating conditions, schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders often prove relevant to legal decisions.  Psychosis itself is neither a 
specific mental disorder nor a formal diagnosis; rather, the term refers to particular 
symptoms that may be associated with several different disorders or even other factors 
(e.g., substance abuse).  It refers broadly to a severe impairment in one’s ability to 
distinguish reality from that which is not real.  Psychosis may denote a group of severe 
symptoms including hallucinations (false sensory experiences such as seeing or hearing 
stimuli that are not present), delusions (false beliefs even despite clear evidence to the 
contrary), or grossly disorganized behavior.   
 Schizophrenia is the most commonly recognized of the psychotic disorders, and is 
characterized by symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, disorganized statements, or 
grossly disorganized behavior.  To meet diagnostic criteria, these symptoms must cause 
significant social or occupational impairment and persist, at least to some degree, for a 
period of six months or more (American Psychiatric Association 2000).  There are 
several subtypes of schizophrenia: Paranoid (featuring prominent delusions and/or 
hallucinations), Disorganized (featuring disorganized speech and/or behavior, and flat or 
inappropriate emotions), and Catatonic (featuring severe physical oddities such as 
4immobile and mute behavior or odd purposeless movement). Schizophrenic individuals 
who may come into contact with the court include, for example: the patient who is so 
grossly disorganized and incoherent that she requires court-ordered treatment to attend to 
basic self-care and safety; or the delusional patient who believes he owns the local 
shopping mall and is repeatedly charged for trespassing on its premises and harassing its 
patrons.  
 Mood Disorders: 
 Mood Disorders are characterized by periods of substantial disturbance in 
emotion and activity level, and may feature episodes of depression (e.g., depressed mood 
and loss of pleasure, decreased energy and activity, changes in sleep or appetite), mania, 
or both.  Mania, or a manic episode, is characterized by an unusually elevated mood that 
persists for at least one week and features symptoms such as inflated or grandiose self-
esteem, decreased need for sleep, distractibility and over-activity, and excessive 
involvement in pleasurable, risky activities.  Individuals experiencing a Major Depressive 
Episode may pose a risk to themselves (via suicidal behaviors or lack of self-care) to such 
an extent that legal intervention is necessary to ensure prompt and adequate treatment.  
Individuals experiencing a Manic Episode, on the other hand, might come into contact 
with the legal system due to criminal charges for risky or grandiose behavior (e.g., 
collecting money from investors in an impulsive and ill-conceived financial scheme, 
becoming aggressive due to increased irritability and impulsivity).  
 Mental Retardation:
A diagnosis of Mental Retardation requires substantially below average 
intellectual functioning (an IQ score around 70 or below) along with related deficits in 
5adaptive functioning. Adaptive functioning refers primarily to daily living skills such as 
communication, self-care, home-living, social skills, and health and safety.  Numerous 
factors may contribute to mental retardation including hereditary conditions, 
chromosomal aberrations, prenatal trauma, or extreme deprivation of nurturance and 
stimulation during infancy and childhood. 
 Personality Disorders:
Whereas most mental disorders are considered illnesses with specific symptoms, 
personality disorders more to be constellations of interpersonal behaviors that are so 
firmly ingrained that they cause substantial problems in daily living.  “A personality 
disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly 
from the expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset 
in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or 
impairment”  (American Psychiatric Association 2000: 685).  Some personality disorders 
frequently manifest in harmful or criminal behavior, particularly the Antisocial, 
Narcissistic, and Borderline personality disorders. But unlike schizophrenia, personality 
disorders do not feature symptoms that alter one’s perception of reality (e.g., 
hallucinations, delusions). Thus, courts have been ambivalent towards the concept of 
personality disorder as presented by mental health professionals, and there is no clear-cut 
trend in legal decisions relating to personality disorders (for example, contrast Foucha v. 
Louisian, 1992 with Kansas v. Hendricks 1997). 
Overview of Relevant Legal Issues: 
 Though there are numerous circumstances in which one’s mental disorder may 
become relevant to questions of law, certain legal questions (e.g., trial competence, legal 
6sanity) explicitly address the question of mental disorder, and in others (e.g., sentencing 
mitigation) mental disorder often becomes salient.  However, it is not diagnosis per se 
that is most relevant to most legal issues.  Rather, the law considers only whether or not 
one manifests deficits in certain functional capacities (e.g., ability to participate 
meaningfully in one’s criminal trial; ability to attend to one’s basic health, hygiene, and 
safety needs).  A diagnosis is relevant only insofar as it relates to these deficits. There is 
never a one-to-one correspondence between a clinical diagnosis and a legal construct. 
Indeed, even the DSM-IV-TR acknowledges,  
 “the clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these 
 conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for 
 example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability 
 determination, and competency” (American Psychiatric Association 2000: 
 xxxvii).  
 Competence to Stand Trial (Adjudicative Competence) 
 Western legal tradition has long held that it is inappropriate to try or convict a 
defendant who cannot understand or meaningfully participate in adjudicatory 
proceedings, including pretrial proceedings (Bonnie 1992).  The Supreme Court of the 
United States explained that it is “fundamental to an adversary system of justice” (Drope 
v. Missouri 1975: 904) that an incompetent defendant not be subject to trial. The 
contemporary standard for trial competence (Dusky v. United States 1960), upon which 
all states have modeled their definitions, demands that a criminal defendant must have 
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
7understanding” and have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him” (402). 
 Typically, defense counsel requests that a judge order a clinical evaluation of trial 
competence when it appears that a defendant may be unable to meaningfully assist in 
mounting a defense. The clinician who conducts such an evaluation almost always 
interviews the defendant, and may also consult collateral information sources and review 
records, in an effort to determine whether the defendant has a mental disorder and 
whether the disorder impairs his or her ability to participate knowingly and meaningfully 
in the trial and to cooperate with counsel. In an effort to reduce subjectivity and increase 
reliability of clinician judgments, scholars have developed several structured measures of 
competence-related abilities (Grisso 2003).  Optimally, clinicians conducting competence 
evaluations address all key psycholegal abilities and adequately explain to the court the 
reasoning that underlies their opinions (Skeem and Golding 1998). The determination of 
trial competence is a legal, rather than clinical decision, and the court is not obliged to 
concur with the evaluating clinician(s). Nonetheless, it appears that courts defers to the 
clinician’s decision in over 90% of cases (Zapf et al. 2004).  
 About 20% of defendants referred for competency evaluation are initially found 
incompetent (Hubbard, Zapf and Ronan 2003), although most are restored to competency 
and ultimately stand trial.  Psychosis is the condition most associated with incompetence, 
with mental retardation also impairing competence in many cases.  Evaluators do not 
reflexively equate psychosis with incompetence; only about half of psychotic defendants 
are found to be incompetent (Nicholson and Kugler 1991).  But it is the functional 
deficits related to these diagnoses, rather than the diagnoses themselves, that preclude 
8participation in trial.  There is no clinical condition that necessarily rules out (or in) trial 
competence.  
Legal Sanity or Criminal Responsibility 
 One of the most controversial and complex questions in criminal law relates to 
legal sanity, also referred to as criminal responsibility or mental state at the time of the 
offense.  Western legal tradition has generally held that those who are unaware of the 
meaning of their illegal acts should not be held criminally responsible for them.  
Consequently, for over a century, legislators have developed and modified legal 
standards of insanity.  Currently, most states use either a standard based upon the 
McNaughten rule or the American Law Institute (ALI) standard (United States v. 
Brawner 1972).  Both require the presence of some mental disorder, and require that this 
disorder impair a defendant’s ability to know or appreciate the legal or moral 
wrongfulness of his behavior. The ALI standard also allows for a “volitional prong,” the 
possibility that the defendant knew the wrongfulness of his behavior but could not 
conform it to the requirements of the law.    
 Whereas competence to stand trial requires assessment of one’s present abilities, 
an evaluation of legal sanity requires inferences about one’s mental state at an earlier 
point in time. Thus, clinical evaluation of legal sanity requires not only an interview with 
the defendant, but an exhaustive review of criminal (e.g., arrest reports, prior offenses) 
and mental health records (e.g., psychiatric hospitalizations), as well as other collateral 
information (e.g., interviews with arresting officers and family members) that may shed 
light on a defendant’s clinical status at the time of the offense (Melton et al. 1997).  The 
defendant’s diagnostic presentation is the variable most strongly associated with a 
9judgment of legal (in) sanity, although there is no one-to-one relationship between any 
particular diagnosis and a legal judgment of “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” (NGRI).  
Defendants whom clinicians opine to be psychotic (often schizophrenic) at the time of the 
offense are most likely to be found legally insane, whereas certain diagnostic categories 
(e.g., personality disorders), are almost never related to a finding of insanity (Cochrane, 
Grisso and Frederick 2001; Warren et al 2004).   
 The public often misunderstands the insanity defense, overestimating the use and 
success of the insanity defense and mistakenly assuming that those found NGRI are 
released upon acquittal (Silver, Cirincione and Steadman 1994). Similarly, the public 
often assumes the insanity defense is employed most often in murder cases, that 
defendants who plead insanity are usually malingering (faking) mental illness, and that 
insanity defense cases devolve into a battle of expert witnesses who disagree regarding 
the presence of mental illness.  Research clearly contradicts each of these “myths” (Perlin 
1996) 
 Other criminal law issues also frequently warrant an evaluation of mental 
disorder.  For example, regarding capital sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 
that juries must consider mitigating circumstances (Penry v. Lynaugh 1989), which often 
include some form of mental disorder, and that Mental Retardation precludes a defendant 
from receiving the death penalty (Atkins v. Virginia 2002)
Civil Commitment 
 All states have civil commitment laws allowing for involuntary hospitalization of 
mentally disordered individuals. Yet mental disorder and a clear need for treatment are 
not, by themselves, sufficient to warrant involuntary hospitalization (O’Conner v. 
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Donaldson 1975).  Rather, civil commitment is only appropriate for those whose mental 
disorder leaves them so impaired as to be 1) a danger to themselves or others, or 2) 
unable to adequately care for themselves; they must need treatment that is unavailable in 
any settings less restrictive than a psychiatric hospital.  
 Clinicians involved in the civil commitment process are often required not only to 
identify a patient’s mental disorder and necessary treatment, but to offer a prediction of 
dangerousness, or an assessment of risk. Originally, researchers maintained that mental 
illness was not associated with violence and that clinical predictions of dangerousness 
were wrong more often than not (Monahan 1984). However, more recent research, which 
tends to emphasize “risk assessment” rather than “predicting dangerousness,” is far less 
pessimistic. Generally, clinicians perform significantly better than chance when they 
consider information that research has identified as relevant to violence risk and when 
they offer predictions for a limited frame of time and circumstances (Borum 1996).  The 
current consensus among scholars is that mental disorder does indeed bear a modest, but 
reliable, relationship to violent behavior (Monahan 1992) and that the risk for violence 
among the mentally disordered increases with 1) active symptoms of psychosis, and 
particularly with 2) active substance abuse.  
 A second form of civil commitment has received increasing attention in recent 
years. Many states adopted Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) statutes in the 1980s and 
1990s to protect the public from repeat sexual offenders.  The typical SVP statute allows 
for civil commitment of sexual offenders even after they have served their prison 
sentences, if there is evidence that they are dangerous by virtue of being prone to 
continued sexual offending, suffer from a “mental abnormality,” and lack volitional 
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control (Kansas v. Hendricks 1997).  Like other civil commitment procedures, adversarial 
court proceedings are used to determine proof of mental disorder and likelihood of future 
dangerousness (Janus and Meehl 1997). Contrary to many other legal standards for 
mental disorder, however, SVP statutes often include personality disorders as a 
qualifying class of mental disorder.   
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